MASCU LINITIES AND VIOLENCE IN INDIA AND INDONESIA

Identifying Themes and Constructs for Research

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INTRODUCTION

This paper sets out the grounds for investigating the phenomenon of men and violence in two prominent Asian countries - India and Indonesia - where local interpersonal violence and civil violence occur frequently. Such events impact harshly on the health and well-being of individuals, families, community life, political stability, economic progress and development programmes. In both countries, there has been very little rigorous sociological investigation into this phenomenon. The problem of men and violence has been primarily located in accounts of colonization, war and insurgencies. It has also been addressed with reference to domestic violence and sexual assault, which results in an understandable and necessary focus on the plight of women. Criminological studies addressing the problem of men and violence have focused on criminals in the two countries, especially conviction rates and the pattern of offences committed (for example, Sung 2004). Psychological studies of violent men and prison populations have concentrated on individual pathologies and apparent ‘types’ of men that habitually commit offences. Historical studies in both countries have considered how colonized men were constructed during colonial occupation and its aftermath.

While not wishing in any way to undermine the value of research endeavours in other fields, the focus of our research program is slightly different. The aim is to understand how subcultures of masculine violence are constructed, maintained and enacted in everyday social practice in India and Indonesia. Accordingly, an important focus for is how men
enact, experience and perceive male violence in their local communities (Kaufman 1987). In our appraisal of the relevant literature to date, we have found remarkably few sociological studies of violence conducted with males, despite their central role in perpetuating or tolerating cultures of violence. There is an urgent need to gain a better understanding of the forms of masculinity that are being expressed, and targeted, when men engage in male-to-male interpersonal violence, and civil violence. Many positive community initiatives, NGO capacity building programmes, and strategies for the empowerment of women are disrupted or even nullified by, violent events in the public realm such as sexual harassment and assault, men fighting each other, crime, and outbreaks of rioting, vigilantism and arson. In both countries, there are gang cultures and organised crime networks that use violence and the threat of violence to enforce their business dealings. Furthermore, there are terrorist networks which use violence to attack ideologically framed targets. We do not see these varying practices of masculine violence as ontologically distinct, but as practices along a continuum comprised of linked masculine cultures of violence in a given society–cultures historically shaped by tradition, colonialism, the state, and late modernity, especially the ‘hypermasculinity’ promoted by cultural globalization (Levy 2007; Ling 2001).

We are also aware that the social organization of prestige is a part of the social structure that most directly influences gender and sexuality for men (Ortner 1981). When it comes to male-male violence this is a most important consideration (Tomsen 1997). In his study of men and drinking violence in Australia, Tomsen acknowledges that violence between men in the drinking context is often heralded by volatile ‘power displays’ in which an ‘assertion of social power and heightened sensitivity to challenges to it is maintained’. He speaks of ‘assaults as interactive incidents characterized by an escalating confrontation over social honour. These may seem trivial in reason, but are often highly meaningful among certain groups of males where the generation and protection of a masculine identity is most valuable’ (Tomsen 1997: 94).

In another example, Mullaney explains that, in the USA, when men are called upon to give an account of their domestic violence towards their wives, they ‘use varying verbal accounts as different means to achieve the same end - that is, not only to save face (…) but also to repair and reestablish masculine selves in a setting that in their minds, has called into question their rights and privileges as men (Mullaney 2007: 223, emphasis in original). This finding has particular relevance for our study. Following her lead, the accounts of violence given by men will not be understood as conveying factual truth. Rather, accounts will be interpreted as bearing upon key discourses of mas-
culine identity, male honour and norms of aggression that inform masculine identities and cultures of violence in India and Indonesia.

In certain areas of both these countries, public violence between men is a taken-for-granted facet of everyday life. Moreover, there is frequent political rioting, and clashes between local militias and the police/military. In such contexts, violence is often viewed by local populations as inevitable - even mundane. However, local instances of civil violence can escalate into looting, destruction of property, assault, rape and murder on a much larger scale (Anand 2007). Such escalations have serious psychological impacts for the individuals involved, present major barriers to development programmes, and have negative economic implications for developing nations such as India and Indonesia. Despite this, in Asia masculinity has remained 'an important lacuna' in gender research (Louie & Edwards 1994: 135).

Sociological research on gender based violence with men is therefore necessary: firstly, because we know little about the masculine ‘half’ of gender politics in South and Southeast Asia, and hence, the picture of non-western masculinities is incomplete in the region (Kimmel 2000). Secondly, we know little about how men themselves understand and experience violent events in their lives. We need to ‘deconstruct various characteristics of masculinity or manhood’ in these countries (Demartoto 2008: 9).

DEFINING OUR TERMS

Masculinity

In our understanding the terms ‘men’ and ‘male’ are taken to refer to the physiological and reproductive characteristics of male persons. In that sense men are men wherever they are and whatever they are doing. ‘Masculinity’ however, refers to socially and culturally constructed ideas of what it means to be male, to be a man. The term masculinity therefore describes the characteristics and behaviours associated with being biologically male for a given culture or subculture (Oakley 1972). For that reason, masculinities vary greatly from country to country, from culture to culture and between status groups of all kinds in a given society or nation state (Oakley 1972). Because there are many different kinds of masculinity, even within the same national culture, in this paper we usually refer to masculinities (plural).

The specific term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is usually attributed to R.W. Connell. However, Donaldson (1993) has also written significantly on the topic. The concept of masculinity as ‘hegemonic’ derives from Gramsci’s theorising (1988: 260) of the state where one group claims and sustains a leading position in society during a given historical period. Domination by
this group is achieved by consensus even while the cultural leadership is invariably contested. Hegemonic masculinity must therefore be understood not as a single discursive entity but as ‘the configuration of gender practice’ at a given point in time that shores up the ‘legitimacy of patriarchy’ (Connell 1995: 77, our emphasis). Writing of traditional gender relations in Asia, Moghadam maintains that ‘senior men of a family have authority over everyone else in that family including younger men and women, who are in turn subject to forms of control and subordination (1993: 104).

For the purposes of social analysis, ‘hegemonic masculinity’ describes a normative or ‘ideal’ type of masculinity occurring in specific times and places (Connell 2002). Hegemonic forms of masculinity are hegemonic because they demand conformity to certain normative characteristics, for example toughness and violence, even though other forms of alternative and marginalised masculinities are always present, and challenge the dominant stereotypes in various ways. The power of hegemonic masculinity is that it provides a cultural benchmark against which all males implicitly measure their gender legitimacy. In this way, hegemonic forms of masculinity affect: men’s health and life expectancy; how male children are raised; and the nature of their relationships with older male relatives, male age peers, girls and women. Most significantly, the ideal of hegemonic masculinity affects men’s attitudes towards, and tendency to use, violence.

Hypermasculinity is a term used to describe hegemonic forms of masculinity that circulate in the global popular media where male heroes and villains possess (often superhuman) physical strength, cunning, bravery, sex drive and aggression. Accordingly, produced as an identity by men in everyday social life, ‘hypermasculinity is an exaggerated expression of traits, beliefs, actions and embodiment considered to be masculine’ – framed up actively to demonstrate ‘opposition to femininity’ (Levy 2007: 325).

Violence

A rapid survey of the available literature indicates the difficulty of reaching a single definition of violence that satisfies the vast range of phenomena that is grouped under the term (for example, Jackman 2002). Accordingly, we have constructed our own definition that draws upon the main strands of contemporary sociological theorising about violence. By violence we mean:

Any act – physical, verbal or emotional – that is intended to, or results in, harm to another person or group. For example, verbal abuse, harassment, bullying, intimidation, extortion, fighting, rioting, assault, rape, torture, manslaughter, murder.
Epistemologically, we understand men equally as agents, victims and observers of male-to-male violence. In considering what causes men to become involved in violence, it is often argued that deprived economic conditions trigger angry young men on the margins of the labour market to involve themselves in physical outpourings of collective rage and resentment. Yet it seems a taste for violence is not just the preserve of marginal and working class men, but runs through a much wider male cohort in the fields of the military, sport, and media (Tilly 2003). Male participation in forms of collective and one-on-one violence must be understood as common, and even pleasurable in some circumstances, rather than unusual and unpleasant by definition (Tomsen 1997). The highly popular movie *Fight Club* amply demonstrated this reality, and the popularity of Asian martial arts films never seems to wane. In another example, fighting for a cause can be constructed as heroic and laudable, and this is the very basis of recruitment in wartime. Young men in particular are drawn to the mythic ideal of the hero, or heroic band of brothers where there is triumph against the odds (Horrocks 1995). Moreover, in certain contexts, extreme male violence such as killing may have a beneficial outcome: defense of the vulnerable; democratic revolution; overthrow of injustice; or the liberation of a nation or a people.

**Civil Violence**

Among other theorists of masculinity, Connell (1995) has argued that historically, nationalist politics has always been an important stage for the promotion of a hegemonic masculinity characterized by violence, aggression, and militarism. Roy maintains that, despite cultural differences, the rhetoric of nationalist/religious identity movements across the globe tends to focus on the recovery of lost masculinity’, where a specific male ethnic/religious ‘other’ is constituted as a threat and a menace to that project of regeneration (2006: 137). Roy’s focused study of the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena movement in India yields the following insight:

The narrative pattern in the nationalist discourse of Shiv Sena is quite simple: the Hindu majority is victimized by the Muslim minority due to the policy of appeasement toward Muslims by Hindu politicians, whom Shiv Sena characterizes as being ‘castrated’, ‘effeminate’, and ‘impotent’. The weakness of Hindu politicians and government officials in dealing assertively with the Muslim threat has resulted in a loss of manhood for Hindus. However, this loss of Hindu masculinity is temporary. With the regeneration of Hindu masculinity via violent action by Shiv Sena’s brave warriors, Hindus will be able to recuperate their manhood. It is only by annihilating and humiliating Indian Muslims that Hindu men can regain their pride and glory (Roy 2006: 141).
In Indonesia the link to masculinity is less tangible, but a parallel to the Shiv Sena discourse may be found in Muslim militias that target Christians—spurred on not only by an antipathy to all things western, but by the belief that Indonesian political leaders have emasculated Muslims—the Islamist version of Indonesian history was a litany of victimhood’ (Dhume 2008: 139). Both Muslim and secular militias target the minority Indonesian Chinese (Christian or Buddhist) who are habitually imagined to be deriving wealth and prosperity at the expense of ‘real’ (Muslim) Indonesians. In both cases, members of the minority group may suffer individual criminal violence, including theft, arson and assault, and experience civil violence, involving mass attacks and fighting. We may understand this phenomenon through Appadurai’s concept of a ‘geography’ of anger in which the majority sector of the population fears a ‘volatile morphing’ where they will be somehow replaced by a minority group in society. Appadurai argues that in reaction to this perceived threat, certain groups within the majority population sustain ‘predatory identities’ that take action to diminish or even wipe out the cultural ‘other’ (2006: 85). The result is often civil violence (Starrett 2009: 223).

In comparison to criminal violence, civil violence, by definition, takes place in the more or less public arena of civil society. It disrupts the local civil order. Civil society may be considered as the ‘realm of organised social life that is open, voluntary and self-generating’ (Hadiwinarta 2008: 276). It is located more or less ambiguously between the institutions of the family and the state. The kind of social order achieved in the realm of civil society is in a sense always precarious because it does not come about through the rule of state law, or from longstanding family and kinship obligations, but arises from the shared intersubjective reality of social actors in assembled collectivities.

Theoretically, the greater the shared sense of cultural norms and social objectives (social capital), the more people will agree about what should be happening locally and nationally, and the more harmonious civil society will be. In practice though, the contemporary realm of civil society is as much characterized by conflict as order, in the two nations under consideration here. While lack of bonding social capital between relatively mobile ethnic/religious populations seeking work in the cities obviously plays a part in generating civil tensions, it is lack of economic capital that shows the strongest correlation with rising tensions in the realm of Indian and Indonesian civil society. This is competition for scarce resources. At the same time though, ethno-religious and nationalist tensions routinely flare up to threaten civil order in both nations and this is not simply
reducible to issues of economic capital. As this brief discussion demonstrates, the question of civil violence is a complex one. For the purposes of our discussion in this paper, the first point worth noting is that civil violence occurs outside the formal institutions of the family and the state, even though the state is often the target. Secondly, civil violence remains almost exclusively the preserve of men.

In saying this, we emphasize the need to productively grasp how everyday cultures of mediated and symbolic male-to-male violence provide the conditions for violent civil events to arise as logical, if not unquestioned practices. Whether individual men participate actively or not in violent civil actions, riots, looting or mass assault, they are affected by local and national cultures of male violence, including the formal state enforcement mechanisms of the police and military brought in to deal with civil unrest.

**MEN AND CIVIL VIOLENCE IN INDIA AND INDONESIA: THE BIG PICTURE**

In some parts of India and Indonesia, civil violence occurs between the military and local militias; in other regions a culture of conflict exists between supporters of political parties; in other areas religion, especially fundamentalist Islam and Hinduism, is claimed to vindicate acts of terrorism. To a certain extent, there does appear to be a link between male civil violence and radical religious movements in India and Indonesia, for example Hindu nationalist extremism (Brass 2003) and Islamic fundamentalism. The recent campaigns of terrorist violence in India and Indonesia have been closely associated with religious fundamentalism and what has been labelled as the ‘masculinisation of nationalism’ (Banerjee 2006). In India the rise of the Hindu fundamentalist movement (Hindutva) has based its campaign of ‘purifying’ the nation by opposing non-Hindu minorities, especially Muslims. Likewise, in Indonesia the bombings in Hindu Bali and the terrorist bombing campaigns conducted elsewhere, by *Jem'ah Islamiyah* and *Laskar Jihad*, have been spearheaded by men whose projected goal is to defend and enforce an exclusive and male dominated model of Islam.

However, this is not the whole picture. Righteous indignation and outrage overlap with political agitation, crime, feuds, ethnic tensions and revenge motives in many civil violence events. Moreover, there are matters of masculine honour, status, peer pressure and the expression of class (and caste) resentments to be considered. Each case reflects the problematic interplay of masculine identity and civil violence, and the increasingly critical role of cultural expressions of masculinity in shaping the safety and wellbeing of Asian populations. In the current age, when transnational
tropes of masculinity freely circulate (Pringle & Pease 2001), violence and physical aggression, it would seem, are becoming expected or ‘admired among men’ in Asia (Connell 2002), reflecting an increasingly dangerous environment for different kinds of men, and for young men, women and children.

India has a violent history of anti-colonial struggle, inter-religious conflict, caste and ethnic disputes and confrontations, which continue to this day (Anand 2007; Banerjee 2005). As suggested above, Hindutva has based its campaign of ‘purifying’ the nation in opposing non-Hindu minorities, especially Muslims. Such communal violence against Muslims reached its climax in the Gujarat riots of 2002, in which over two thousand Muslims were murdered, and tens of thousands were left uprooted and dislocated—refugees in their own land. Once again, women were at the receiving end of such hyper-nationalist terror, subjected to rape and other practices of violence and control. There is a growing body of literature that links the rise of these fundamentalist and rightwing nationalist movements to repressive cultural expressions of masculinity (Tilly 2003). Furthermore, violence and physical aggression are key elements of lower caste Indian masculinities, and are intertwined with resistance to caste-based subordination (for example, Doron 2008; Rogers 2008; De Neve 2004). Yet like Indonesia, masculinity has not been explored to any great extent in South Asia (Charsley 2005; Srivastava 2004a), and only in a limited way with regard to violence per se.

For Indonesia, mass violence has been a significant feature of 20th century national and political history (Sidel 2007; Nordholt 2002). It has ranged from wars of resistance against the Japanese and the Dutch; to the anti-communist purges of 1965 in which over a million people were killed; to the anti-Chinese riots in the 1970s and 1990s; to military abuses of power; to the radical Muslim jihadi bombings of Bali and western targets (Vickers 2005; Nordholt 2002). Preman militias still assault and terrorize local people, and the implicit fear of violence is arguably everywhere in an outwardly peaceful nation. In a recent survey of 3565 Indonesian youth aged 14-24, tawuran [fighting], and narkoba [drugs] were two major anxieties identified by male respondents (Nilan 2008). Accounts from male Indonesian Muslim youth revealed not only a personal concern with gaining and protecting gengsi [status], but in principle support for: bullying; jihadi acts of violence against those of other faiths (Sidel 2007); attacks on rival political groups (Vickers 2005: 213); and on fans of opposing sporting teams. Male Javanese youth, in 2007, were observably ‘nervous’ (see Alter 2000) about the multifarious implicit threats of violence from other males. Yet, because masculinity has been studied so
little in Indonesia (Oetomo 2000: Clark 2004a; Boellstorff 2004), violence is almost never seen as a specifically gendered phenomenon (for an exception see Elmhirst 2007).

MASCULINITY AND VIOLENCE IN INDIA

According to researchers Osella and Osella, when we search the South Asian literature for ‘an understanding of men, masculinities and masculine hierarchies, we encounter an ambivalent situation: men are certainly present (…) but they are generally not the explicit object of study’ (2006: 4). Yet, in overall terms, masculinity as a phenomenon has been studied far more often in India than in Indonesia. For example, Dumont’s (1980) original study of the caste system in the 1960s may be read as implying that the ideal of the Brahmin male represents hegemonic masculinity in India. A host of other studies, of contested or complicit masculinities, have followed that either confirm or challenge this claim (for example, Derne 2000; Alter 2002; Jain 2004; De Neve 2004; Srivastava 2004b; Basu and Banerjee 2006; Osella and Osella 2006; Roy 2006; Doron 2008: Rogers 2008).

Osella and Osella (2006: 4) claim that there have been two main strands of research where men in India have been the explicit object of study: ‘the putative South Asian “culture-bound” syndrome of semen-loss anxiety’, and ‘analyses of masculinities under colonialism’ (see also Srivastava 2004a). The latter include ethnographies of masculinity written in the tradition of ‘subaltern studies’, where the term subaltern connotes both subordination and resistance (see for example Rogers 2008: 86). One analytical trend seems to have been to create binary pairs, typologies or lists of masculine archetypes. For example, Dumont’s four stages of man: – the celibate student; the householder; the forest-dweller and the renouncer (1980) are derived from the Hindu tradition. In contrast, in his 1995 study Derne discerned four modern categories of men in his fieldsite: true believers, cowed conformists, innovative mimetists, and unapologetic rebels. Regarding masculinities within the contemporary Hindutva movement, Banerjee (2005) identifies complementary constructions of masculinity: the Hindu soldier and the warrior monk (see also Basu and Banerjee 2006: 490). In his discussion of South Asian masculinities, Srivastava states that contemporary understandings of what it is to be a man in India ‘are the concomitant of the varied histories of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras, and caste and religious identities’ (2007: 329). He points to the valorisation of masculinity through persistence in the preference for male children that has resulted in a significant gender imbalance in some states. Moreover, there
remains a seemingly unbreakable link between men’s ‘honour’ and women’s ‘propriety’ (330) that feeds into a high incidence of domestic violence and also into male-to-male violence.

The apparent ‘muscular manliness’ (Banerjee 2005; Srivastava 2007; Jain 2004) that now seems to define hegemonic masculinity in India has many sources. Srivastava (2007: 331) maintains that the contemporary ‘conjoining’ of muscularity and masculinity appears to be a ‘product of transnational cultural flows’. Banerjee points to the British Raj where particular kinds of Indian masculinities were produced in the colonial encounter (see also Osella and Osella 2006: 5; Basu and Banerjee 2006: 477). British images of empire shaped Christian notions of manliness back home and in the colony:

Christian manliness was a Protestant construct. It emerged in the mid-nineteenth century when British imperial power was at its zenith and drew on various traits - self-control, discipline, confidence, martial prowess, military heroism, heterosexuality, and rationality (Basu and Banerjee 2006: 479).

In turn, these ideals are held to have generated the key hegemonic masculinity of Hindu masculinist nationalism (Hansen 1996). Regarding the complementary constructions of the Hindu soldier and the warrior monk within the contemporary Hindutva movement, Banerjee (2005) identifies both as expressions of hegemonic masculinity that allude to aggression. Although historically these models of manhood emerged during the colonial period, they are being ‘regenerated’ in the context of Hindutva politics in contemporary India (Roy 2006). In other words, ‘the cultural logic of masculine Hinduism and nation adopted the categories implicit in imperial hegemonic masculinity in their resistance to British gaze’ (Basu and Banerjee 2006: 490).

There seems to be ample evidence linking these Hindu nationalist heroic masculine identities to civil violence events of various kinds across India. They have been described as driven by hypermasculinized ‘imaginings’ of revolutionary nationhood (Basu and Banerjee 2006: 490). However, other apparent correlations between constructions of masculinity and the incidence of interpersonal and civil violence also need to be considered. For example, the term for an Indian thug is goonda, and goonda criminal gangs are deeply embedded in local societies (Hudson and Den Boer 2002: 34). They may be hired for the purpose of stirring up trouble, whether political, religious, or personal. In another example, Hudson and De Boer expand upon the fact that there is a preference for male offspring to propose that large Asian states like China and India show ‘exaggerated gender inequality’--a surplus of unemployed and unmarried young men (2002: 6). They
argue that this leads to a heightened state of internal instability in those countries that greatly increases the likelihood of criminal and civil violence. The authors find that north and northwest states of India, that show the highest male-female sex ratios, the highest fertility rates, and the highest incidence of people not in the labour market, are the states where violence and crime are most prevalent (Hudson and De Boer 2002: 34). ‘Extensive interdistrict contrasts (...) show a strong – and statistically very significant – relation between the female-male ratio in the population and the scarcity of violent crimes’ (Sen 1999: 200). One must be wary, however, of taking correlation for causality, since both strong preference for male offspring and high rates of male violence may actually be the outcome of a third set of factors, most likely a combination of poverty, archaic patriarchal traditions, lack of education and long standing local violent disputes over sovereignty that require an endless supply of fighters.

MASCULINITY AND VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

Masculinity as a distinct topic has been little studied in the Indonesian context: ‘masculinities have tended to remain either unmarked (the assumed “norm”), or at best one-dimensional (the patriarch)” (Elmhirst 2007: 225). In one of the few studies to date, Nilan et al. propose that,

While the globally-mediated, Western, sexualised ‘playboy’ ideals of masculinity now play strongly in Indonesian urban male culture, Islamist discourse in Indonesia is vociferous on the topic of how Western sexuality poses the major threat to male Muslim piety. Indonesian Muslim masculinities are arranged in various identity configurations around these two major influences (Nilan et al. 2009: 181).

However, it was not always so. New Order policies governing civil life until 1998 were emphatically gendered (Robinson 2000: 141). The cultural diversity of indigenous gender orders in the archipelago was homogenized into a nationally-promoted binary of masculinity and femininity: kodrat pria and kodrat wanita. State-sanctioned gender roles were integral to the project of nation building (Anderson 1990; Simon and Barker, 2002). In her study of sexual politics and nationalism in the birth of the New Order state in Indonesia, Wieringa notes that ‘nations as socio-political entities are often described as bonded together by a deep camaraderie of men’. She reminds us that this ‘male bonding rests upon the control over the behavior and sexuality of “their” women’, and that ‘controlling women and girls is a central concern both of the military and of men who are “protecting” the nation’ (Wieringa 2003: 72).
The elevated Javanese discourse of masculinity — Bapak — was significant for hegemonic masculinity during the New Order period. ‘During the New Order the upper-class Javanese priyayi model of emotional self-restraint was widely deployed as an “ideal” pattern of masculine behaviour’ (Clark 2004b: 118). This ‘ideal’ pattern of masculine behaviour was an important component of Bapakism (Geertz 1961), around which the system of authority in the formidable New Order bureaucracy was organized (Robinson 1998: 67). Bapakism blended feudal traditions of patron-client with a modern development paradigm. In a striking example, Suharto made himself known as Bapak Pembangunan, the father of development (Rahim 2001; Scherer 2006). In principle Bapak always rules over the family; but often also over the business; the town; and the nation state. He is entitled to exercise dominance because of his God given wisdom, self-control and mastery of emotions. These qualities grant him authority over women, children, and male underlings. He achieves hegemony through the exercise of ‘refined’ power embodying ‘emotional self-restraint’ (Clark 2004b: 118; see also Brenner 1995). His calm and passive demeanour demonstrates the triumph of akal— reason and control over base passions —nafsu (Peletz 1995: 88-91). Even today, when Indonesians speak of the ‘proper’ role of a husband/father, Bapak remains the point of reference.

Young unmarried men (pemuda, remaja, cowok-cowok) present a challenge to the authority of older men (Scherer, 2006). Their behaviour is often kasar (coarse, flamboyant, playful, outrageous, animalistic). They are ruled by passion rather than reason. Their operation of masculine power is of a different, less refined order. It is signalled by a different hegemonic ideal of Indonesian masculinity — pemuda. Although the term pemuda means a youth or young man, it usually refers to a young male activist or fighter. Pemuda led the struggle against colonization (Anderson 2006) and were on the streets again when Suharto was forced to step down in 1998. They have also been active during subsequent elections (Scherer 2006: 205). On the negative side, Pemuda Pancasila thugs were active when Suharto first took over power. At present, some youthful preman (thug) militias, available for hire as street mobs to any political cause, like to call themselves pemuda (Wilson 2008).

Post 1998, the state normative male role has been significantly challenged and reshaped. It is claimed this signals a ‘crisis’ for Indonesian masculinity (Clark 2004a).

Just as the Indonesian nation has found itself in a deep crisis in the years following the fall of Suharto, as a constructed category the Indonesian ‘man’ is also undergoing a period of fluidity. Cultural icons such as the landmark film
Kuldesak suggest that the contemporary image of the Indonesian male is torn between outdated and archetypal images and ‘alternative’ or non-traditional masculinities (Clark 2004b: 131).

Boellstorff (2004: 469) suggests that ‘norms for Indonesian national identity may be gaining a new masculinist cast’, driven by a changing labour market, Islamist discourse and mediated global hypermasculinity. For example, male Islamist youth want to ‘Islamise’ Indonesia and protect Muslims from western secular and Christian influences (Smith-Hefner 2005: 442). As far as class origins go, the evidence for male membership of Islamist groups is mixed. For example, Fealy (2004: 110) noted the relative youth and poverty of male radical Islamist group members: ‘one quantitative survey of radical group members in Jakarta, found that 35 per cent of respondents were unemployed or experiencing socio-economic difficulties’. The argument is that poverty draws embittered, economically marginal young males into radical fringe groups (Bruce 2008). However, middle class university educated youth have also long been involved in radical Islamist groups in Indonesia (van Bruinessen 2002: 136). Religious chauvinism, anti-western rhetoric, control of not only female but male sexuality, and the danger for men of interactions with unrelated women are key focii (see Ouzgane 2006; also Boellstorff 2005).

The spread of a strong culture of Islamism in Indonesia since 1998 has shown mixed effects for men (Bennett 2005). On the positive side, theological emphasis on education for both sexes, and the complementary partnership of marriage as the basis for social life means men find their moral roles as dedicated husbands and fathers considerably emphasized. On the negative side, censorship and the emphasis on public piety and formal marriage limit the expression of non-marital sexuality. There is strong condemnation not only of homosexuality, but of pre-marital sex and adultery, realized in recent anti-pornography legislation (Boellstorff 2007; 2005). At the same time, though, there has been extraordinary growth in the production and dissemination of locally produced pornography (Suryakusuma 2000).

The criminal or gang member is a common Indonesian media stereotype of masculinity. He could be a preman (thug), a drug user or dealer, a pimp, or just a participant in the gambling, drinking, whoring, ‘fight club’ culture that characterizes some inner city street life after midnight (for example Berman 2003; Noszlopy 2005; Elmhirst 2007; Baulch 2007). He treats women badly, shows no respect for authority and constitutes a threat to law and order (Wilson 2008). Across the secular/religious cultural discourse of division he is
closely related in attitudes towards violence to the young jihadi. Yet, signifi-
cantly, he is also related to the masculinist code of behaviour favoured by the
police and the military.

Robinson (2008: 1) begins her account of masculinity in Indonesia by
pointing out that ‘the centralised authoritarian power wielded by the Suharto
regime was symbolically anchored by a militarised hegemonic masculinity
that supported the monopolisation of political and economic power by a small
elite of military men and rent-seeking cronies’. This aptly describes the hier-
archy of hegemonic masculinities under the New Order regime. At the high-
est point of the hierarchy of masculinities was the Bapak, a modernized ver-
sion of the ideal benevolent patriarch of traditional Java. The ultimate
expression of the New Order Bapak was President Suharto himself, self-titled
as Bapak Pembangunan, or the ‘father of development’, who guided and pro-
tected the nation, using all forms of power, including state violence. Robinson
(2008) notes that the form of hegemonic masculinity celebrated under the
New Order tended to erase the wide variety of masculine identities that had
once prevailed across the archipelago (see also Boellstorff 2005; Peletz 1995).
In particular, the proper role of men as breadwinners, controllers of family
finances and protectors of women was elevated, even though some aspects of
this role contradicted or ignored local cultural norms (Boellstorff 2007). In
Java for example, traditionally men did not handle the family money at all and
women were the traders and organizers of home and locally based enterprizes
(Robinson 2008: 6-7).

In his discussion of organized civil violence in Indonesia, Wilson (2006)
makes the masculine nature of the phenomenon quite clear in his descrip-
tions. For example, one of the civil militia (preman) groups he investigated in
Jakarta was the FBR (Forum Betawi Rempug – Betawi Brotherhood Forum).

When I visited FBR’s headquarters in 2003, the street was fi lled with around
seventy well-built men wearing black and camouflage military-style uniforms
emblazoned with the FBR logo; they were waiting to go on ‘patrol’ in the
neighborhood. Some were armed with wooden batons and barely concealed

Wilson also undertook research on the FPI (Front Pembela Islam – The
Islamic Defenders Front). He writes:

On 24 September 1998, a month after its founding, FPI made its fi rst public
appearance, attacking student activists at the Christian Atmajaya University
on the pretext of challenging ‘left-wing and Christian students who are paid
by American Jews’ (...) One month later FPI was involved in a bloody
pitched battle with Christian Ambonese security guards in Ketapang, Cen-
tral Jakarta. In the aftermath fourteen were dead and the public was left with
an indelible image of white-robed and turbaned young men angrily wielding machetes and swords in the name of Islam (Wilson 2006: 282).

Wilson implies, largely in his choice of language, that there is great deal of similarity in the attitudes to civil violence, between the young men involved in FBR and FPI, despite the apparent secular-religious divide between the groups. His argument is that political gangsters, preman militias, vigilantes and violent jihadi groups have been major beneficiaries of decentralized governance and decision making in Indonesia, since they can earn a great deal of money in the service of corrupt local politicians, greedy businessmen and even radical fundamentalist imams (see Dhume 2008). As the preman and jihadi hold on urban civil life grows, attacks on them from others also increase, further intensifying civil unrest (Wilson 2006: 291).

CONCLUSION

It is easy to quickly find similarities in the phenomenon of masculinities and violence between India and Indonesia. Religious radicalism is present in both countries for example. There are also strong resonances between the violent masculine subcultures of goonda in India and preman in Indonesia. In both countries, forms of hegemonic masculinity remain linked to the state, to nationalist movements and militaristic cultures. Moreover, in contrast to previous generations, young men in both countries are now favouring attractive masculinity, and devoting time and money to building their bodies (Srivastava 2007; Clark 2004b), which would seem to point to transnational media flows that encourage both male aggression and narcissism at the same time.

However, it is dangerous to assume too much similarity (Pringle and Pease 2001). For example, there is a much more intense alcohol drinking culture among men in India than Indonesia. The fact that Indonesia is a multi-ethnic archipelago, favours particular local distinctions of masculinity, and specific forms of disputes over local sovereignty, that contrast with those in India. Connell and Messerschmidt's rethinking of hegemonic masculinity is useful here (2005). They point out that local patterns of hegemonic masculinity are located within regional patterns which sit within a global gender order, and thus a masculinity that is hegemonic in one area, social strata, or generation, may be regarded as marginal or even stigmatized in another. Similarly, in India just as much as in Indonesia, ‘a complex mixture of historical, cultural, and political processes [are] at work in shaping patterns of violence in different areas’ (Barron and Sharpe 2008: 416).

In short, detailed research is needed in both countries. In such an investigation, although our topic is masculinities and violence, we must be careful
not to assume that universal male qualities or characteristics lie behind the broad parameters of the phenomenon. Rather, we propose that understanding cultures of male violence from a local male perspective, is a key strategy for devising effective approaches to facilitate cultural change in the country and the region, and towards achieving greater levels of peace and stability for men, women and their families.

NOTE
1. For a useful discussion see Nagel (1998).

REFERENCES


Hansen, T.B. 1996. ‘Recuperating masculinity: Hindu nationalism, violence and the exorcism of the Muslim “Other”’, *Critique of Anthropology*, 16(2): 137-172.


